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RECAPTURING THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT BEHIND THE 
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Scenario 1: Imagine coming home after a long day of work and hearing a 
phone call as you walk in.  The caller ID lists an unknown number or an area 
code you do not recognize.  You pick up the phone; it is the same debt 
collector who has called you the last three weeks, requesting payment of 
medical bills you incurred last year.  Later that night, you search the internet 
for “Debt Help” and come across an advertisement claiming that “Collection 
companies can’t legally collect if they can’t prove it.”  Although you know that 
you do in fact legally owe the debt, you cannot help but wonder whether the 
advertisement you read really could put an end to the stress.  You know what 
you are doing is not right, but you are dealing with a debt collector who you’ve 
never met and who is giving you no choice; so what’s the big deal? 
Scenario 2: Twenty-five years ago, you were hospitalized after a bad car 
accident. Unfortunately, after your release, you were unable to pay for the full 
cost of your visit.  However, the hospital was a charitable organization and 
agreed to forgive the remaining debt. You have since forgotten about the debt 
and have planned your budget accordingly.  Recently, you received a letter 
from a debt collector demanding the remainder of the balance.  The letter 
informs you that you have the right to contest the debt, but the letter uses 
extremely harsh words, threatening legal action within ten days if you do not 
pay.  Although you consider challenging the debt, you are afraid of the 
threatened legal action and decide to pay.  You only find out later that the debt 
you just paid was never legally owed. 
As Americans face a recession of unknown proportions,1 largely due to 
consumers’ involvement with risky mortgages and high credit-card bills,2 the 
 
 1. Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Recession To Be Longer than Usual: UMich, REUTERS, Feb. 8, 
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0826726720080208.  Not only do many fear that this 
is the worst recession our country has faced in a quarter of a century, some predict that conditions 
will get worse before they get better.  Maura Reynolds & Peter Nicholas, U.S. Says Recession Is 
Worst in 26 Years, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at A1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-
01-31/news/17199199_1_white-house-robert-gibbs-wall-street. 
 2. Reynolds & Nicholas, supra note 1, at A1. 
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risk of large numbers of consumers defaulting on loans is a very real problem.3  
Struggling for any kind of cash flow,4 businesses are forced to seek out 
collection agencies, which either collect money for the business at a percentage 
or who buy the debt for pennies on the dollar.5  These collectors then become 
the legal holder of this debt.6  Their actions are governed by the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), a consumer protection statute passed by 
Congress in 1978 as a means to curb abusive collection activities.7 
As the above examples illustrate, the consumer-credit industry faces a 
constant struggle between keeping its creditors able to extend lines of credit 
while protecting consumers from abusive and harassing demands for payment.  
The FDCPA, devised for the purpose of striking that balance,8 comes up short 
in several ways.  As a result, an onslaught of litigation has ensued, pitting the 
unwitting consumer against the often fair and honest collector.  In the end, the 
losers are creditors, consumers, and the taxpayers who support our courts, 
suffering at the expense of consumer-advocacy attorneys. 
As harmful as frivolous litigation can be to the collections industry, there 
are those collection agencies that do break the law in their collection efforts, 
often targeting minorities, the elderly9 and poor consumers.10  While the 
FDCPA does provide enforcement mechanisms against these agencies, the law 
stops short of solving the problem.  By allowing creditors to assign their 
delinquent accounts to collectors whom they know will likely use unethical 
means to collect debt, the law provides little incentive for creditors to choose 
collectors which practice their trade honestly.  Assigning a debt to an unethical 
collector is a win-win situation for the creditor, as they might collect more, 
face no penalties and will not have their company’s name associated with 
abhorrent collection practices. 
Part I of this note analyzes how large numbers of unwary consumers and 
honest debt collectors attempt to tread carefully in the modern debt collection-
 
 3. Christine Cadena, Fair Debt Collection: Facts Often Overlooked, ASSOCIATED 
CONTENT, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/118259/fair_debt_collection_ 
facts_often_overlooked.html (further stating that the average U.S. household is $7,200 in debt). 
 4. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, CHOOSING THE RIGHT DEBT BUYER 7 (2008), 
available at http://www.hfma.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=2317. 
 5. Abigail Curtis, For Whom the Bell Tolls; Debt Collection Business Flourishes in 
Recessionary Economy, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 20, 2008, at C1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006); S. REP. NO. 95-
382 at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1966. 
 8. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 3–4. 
 9. See generally Matthew W. Ludwig, Abuse, Harassment, and Deception: How the 
FDCPA Is Failing America’s Elderly Debtors, 16 ELDER L.J. 135 (2008). 
 10. See generally Robert B. Chapman, “Honest and Unfortunate” or Dishonest and 
Greedy? Discriminating Against the Discriminated-Against in Bankruptcy, Presentation at the 
Annual Meeting of the the Law and Society Association (May 27, 2004). 
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industry.  Part II introduces the history and relevant portions of the FDCPA 
and Congress’ original intent.  Part III discusses the important role the 
collections industry plays in our nation’s economy, particularly in maintaining 
a lending environment.  Part IV reveals that empirical evidence suggests 
consumers, when given the fair opportunity, fully intend to pay debts they 
incur.  Part V discusses the problem of consumers who, disgruntled and 
uncertain about what debt they actually owe, too often give in to the temptation 
to seek a consumer-advocacy attorney to eliminate debt they actually owe.  
These attorneys exploit the vagueness of the FDCPA as well as portions which 
have not kept current with rapidly changing communications technology.  
Finally, Part VI argues that, by bringing the debtor into the process more 
effectively and by requiring collection agencies to offer settlements, more 
debtors will take responsibility for their debts and be less likely to seek 
frivolous lawsuits. In addition, it recommends the addition of a federal cause of 
action against original creditors who outsource their collections to negligent 
contractors as a means to preemptively stop abusive collection efforts and 
subsequent litigation.  Lastly, it makes suggestions for amendments to the 
FDCPA in order to eliminate some of the frequently litigated technical issues 
raised by consumer advocacy attorneys. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Advocated by consumer groups, labor unions and organizations which 
represent debt collectors,11 the FDCPA was passed in 1977 as an amendment 
to the Consumer Credit Protection Act.12  The legislation’s stated goal was to 
“protect consumers from a host of unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt 
collection practices without imposing unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt 
collectors.”13  The need for this legislation was based on a study of third-party 
debt collection by the Banking and Consumer Affairs Subcommittee of 
Congress, which examined the growing business of third-party debt collection 
in the United States.14  Such debt collection, which is vital to the health of the 
American economy, will be discussed below.15  Essentially, Congress became 
concerned with the lack of regulation concerning this growing breed of debt 
 
 11. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2. 
 12. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o (2006)).  The Consumer Credit Protection Act was the first 
general federal consumer protection bill passed by Congress.  Although its original purpose was 
to protect debtors by mandating full disclosure of the terms of loans, it failed to address the debt-
collection end of the process. Consumer Credit Protection Act, The Free Dictionary by Farlex, 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Consumer+Credit+Protection+Act. 
 13. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 1–2. 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
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collectors.16  State laws were largely seen as ineffective, as they often had 
difficulty regulating and punishing out-of-state, third-party debt collectors.17  
Also, as many as 13 states did not have debt collection laws at all, leaving 40% 
of the nation’s population without protection.18  The Consumer Credit 
Protection Act, the Act which the FDCPA amended,19 was seen as too weak 
and did not specifically address third-party debt collection.20  Many consumer-
advocacy groups reported that collectors were sometimes abusive in their 
collection efforts, made false threats, used inappropriate language in telephone 
calls, threatened violence  and collected debt that was no longer legally 
owed.21  In addition, debt collecting lobbies argued that unethical debt 
collectors retained a competitive advantage over honest ones. 22 
A. Who the Act Applies To 
The FDCPA only regulates the behavior of debt collectors, which has been 
determined to mean all third-party debt collectors.23  The definition of “debt 
collector,” as stated in the statute, is “any person 1) who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business, the 
principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, or 2) who regularly 
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 
asserted to be owed or due another.”24  Original creditors are explicitly 
excluded from this definition, except when a creditor 1) uses a pseudonym 
which suggests that a third-party collector is involved in the collection process 
or 2) obtains the debt after default for the purpose of collection.25  In addition, 
the statute only applies to debt in connection with purchases for personal, 
family, or household purposes; it does not cover debts incurred in one’s 
business.26 
 
 16. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r (2006); S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 1; Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006). 
 20. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 3. 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4).  Whether a creditor has used a name other than its own depends 
on whether the name used is sufficiently identified with the name used by the creditor in 
conducting the underlying transaction.  Randolph Bragg, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
15 U.S.C. 1692 ET SEQ., 1591 12TH ANN. CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES LITIG. INST. 437, 455 
(2007). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 
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B. Behavior Which Constitutes Violations of the Act 
Many violations under the FDCPA deal with communication from the 
collector to the debtor.  The statute defines a “communication” as “the 
conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person 
through any medium.”27  Communications to the debtor may not be false, 
deceptive, or misleading.28  The standard used to determine whether a 
collector’s methods fall within this definition is the “least sophisticated 
consumer” standard.29 
In a collection agency’s attempt to make initial contact with the debtor, it 
must disclose clearly to the debtor that the communication is for the purpose of 
collecting a debt, and that any information obtained will be used for that 
purpose.30  This is been referred to as the “Mini Miranda” warning and will be 
discussed in depth later in this comment.31 
Within five days of the initial communication to a debtor, a collector is 
required to provide a debtor with a “validation notice,” unless it has already 
been included in the first communication.32  The law requires this notice to 
inform the debtor of the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor to whom 
the debt was originally owed, and a statement saying that the consumer has 30 
days from receipt of the notice to dispute any or all of the debt.33  The dispute 
of any debt must be sent to the collector in writing, upon which collection 
efforts must cease.34  The debt collector must then obtain verification of the 
debt and send it to the consumer.35  It is still unclear what words may or may 
not accompany the validation notice.36 
In its communications with a debtor, a collector may not use any “unfair or 
unconscionable means in order to collect a debt.”37  This prohibits the 
collection of any amounts that have been illegally included in the debt total, 
including but not limited to collection charges, interest, services charges, late 
 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
 29. Bragg, supra note 25, at 457.  “This standard serves the dual purpose of protecting all 
consumers, including the inexperienced, the untrained and credulous, from deceptive debt 
collection practices and protecting debt collectors against liability for bizarre idiosyncratic 
consumer interpretations of collection materials.”  Essentially, the court will judge whether the 
collector has acted deceptively based upon what would deceive the least-sophisticated consumer. 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). 
 31. See infra Parts V.A–C. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)–(5). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
 36. Elwin Griffith, Identifying Some Trouble Spots in the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act: A Framework for Improvement, 83 NEB. L. REV 762, 784 (2005). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 
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fees, or bad-check handling charges.38  These fees may be legally added to the 
debt if they were provisions of the service contract signed by the debtor and do 
not conflict with state law.39 
Under the FDCPA, “any conduct, the natural consequence of which is to 
harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with a debt,” is subject to 
civil damages.40  This conduct includes unnecessary calls to third parties, 
multiple calls to consumers with the purpose of harassment, and abusive 
tactics, specifically the use of obscene, profane, or abusive language.41  In 
addition, collectors may not communicate with a consumer at any time or place 
which is unusual or known to be inconvenient to the consumer, and they may 
not communicate with a debtor at his place of employment.42  In addition, 
violation of the FDCPA is a strict liability offense; a claimant need not allege 
that a defendant purposely or negligently attempted to harass the consumer, 
and need only prove one violation to trigger penalties.43 
C. Third Parties 
In the interest of protecting the consumer’s privacy, a debt collector may 
not communicate the details of a debt to any other person but the consumer.44  
A debt collector may, however, do so to find out the location of the alleged 
debtor.45  Past cases have awarded damages to consumers when a collector 
accidentally called the wrong number with information about a debt, left a 
message for a debtor and somebody else overheard and when a collector 
inadvertently contacted a spouse.46  In the same interests of privacy, the 
FDCPA has banned the use of postcards to communicate the presence of a 
debt.47 
 
 38. STAFF COMMENTARY ON THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, § 808(1), http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/commentary.htm#808 
[hereinafter FTC STAFF COMMENTARY]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. 
 41. FTC STAFF COMMENTARY, supra note 38, § 806; 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1), (3).  The Staff Commentary of the FTC has determined that the 
hours in which a collector may contact a debtor are between the hours of 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. local 
time.  FTC STAFF COMMENTARY, supra note 38, §805(a). 
 43. See Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1322 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that although it is 
in the court’s discretion whether or not to award damages, the FDCPA is a strict-liability statute).  
See also Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 
 45. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. 
 46. Federal Trade Commission v. Check Enforcement, No. Civ.A. 03-2115, 2005 WL 
1677480, at *8 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005) (holding that voicemail messages overheard by family that 
were intended for the debtor was a violation of the debtor’s privacy and thus a violation of the 
FDCPA). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(4). 
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D. Damages 
A debt collector who has violated any provision of the FDCPA is liable for 
actual damages.48  These damages can include emotional distress, loss of 
income for missed work and other remedies.49  In addition to actual damages, 
the consumer may be awarded “such additional damages as the court may 
allow, not exceeding $1000.”50  The statute lays out how a court should award 
such damages, as it must consider the “frequency and persistence of non-
compliance by the debt collector, the nature of such non-compliance, and the 
extent to which the non-compliance was intentional.”51  However, it remains 
unclear what “not exceeding “$1000” exactly means.52  Although the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits have held that statutory award damages may not be made per 
violation but per case brought against the collector,53 other Circuits disagree, 
and Congress has not responded by codifying one of these approaches.54 
E. Attorneys’ fees 
If a consumer wins his or her case on the merits, he or she is entitled to an 
award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.55  However, if the court 
determines that the consumer has brought a claim in bad faith, the collector 
may be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees.56 
F. Underlying Premises of the Act 
While the Banking and Consumer Affairs Subcommittee concluded that 
there was need for substantial federal legislation to regulate third-party debt 
collectors, it put forth two very important premises.  Firstly, although the 
presence of unscrupulous debt collectors was a widespread problem that 
affected a large segment of the population, such bad actors were the exception 
to the rule.57  Instead, most debt collectors were honest business men and 
 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1). 
 49. Household Credit Services v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 90 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2).  FTC STAFF COMMENTARY, supra note 38. These additional 
damages are equivalent to statutory damages. 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). 
 52. Bragg, supra note 25, at 483. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). 
 56. See generally Csugi v. Monterey Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 3:95CV2140, 2001 WL 1841444, 
at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2001) as cited in Bragg, supra note 25, at 487 n.310.  All attorneys’ fees 
are calculated using the lodestar method, which multiplies the number of hours reasonably 
expended by a reasonable hourly rate.  See Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, 2001 Update on 
the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 56 BUS. LAW. 1231, 1244 (2001) (citing Hensley 
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). 
 57. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2 (1977). 
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women, providing an important service in several sectors of the economy for 
small and large businesses alike.58  Also, the concept of the ubiquity of the 
“deadbeat debtor,” which is described as a consumer who purchases goods on 
credit with no intention of ever paying for them, was relatively misguided.59 
III.  THE DEBT COLLECTION INDUSTRY 
As consumer-advocacy attorneys dig their feet in, ostensibly fighting for 
the interests of the consumer, they are winning more and more judgments 
against collection agencies.60  While complaints to the Federal Trade 
Commission are on the rise,61 debt collectors, honest and dishonest alike, face 
an onslaught of litigation.62  At the time the FDCPA was passed, Senators 
Harrison Schmitt (R-New Mexico), Jake Garn (R-Utah) and John Tower (R-
Texas) expressed concern regarding the availability of these civil remedies 
against debt collectors.63  Specifically, they feared that increased regulation 
would have a drastic effect on small businesses, which would likely have a 
particularly hard time assigning delinquent debt.64  In addition, they 
forewarned that the availability of credit to consumers would be drastically 
affected, especially during times of widespread credit crises.65  In the end, they 
claimed, the consumer would be the loser, bearing the cost of these civil 
remedies through higher interest rates and an increased cost of goods.66 
Unfortunately, the senators’ predictions, in some ways, have come to 
fruition.  To understand the effect of these frivolous claims, one must 
understand how collection agencies work and how important these businesses 
are to the U.S. economy. 
A. The Importance of the Debt Collection Industry 
When a business extends a line of credit to a consumer, they do so with the 
belief that the consumer will pay back all payments due, including interest.  As 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 3. 
 60. See A.D. Sanderson, Pretrial Litigation in Consumer Advocacy, 79 OKLA. BAR ASS’N 
579, 579 (2008), available at http://www.okbar.org/obj/accesstojustice/2008/030808.htm. 
 61. See Jennifer Pirone & Lee Ferran, Beware of Dirty Debt Collection Practices: Getting 
the Money at All Costs Causes Some Debt Collectors to Break the Law, ABC NEWS ONLINE 
(Nov. 1, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=6159203 (further stating that consumers 
feel as though collection agencies treat all debtors like deadbeats, which causes collectors to use 
intimidation and harassment to collect debt). 
 62. Id. 
 63. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 9. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Rachel Witkowski, SBA Loans Slammed by Credit Crunch, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., Jan. 
21, 2009, 2009 WLNR 1169682. 
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soon as the consumer stops making payments, rendering the account 
delinquent, the business has a choice.  Many large businesses have the 
resources to collect their bills in-house, and often find this more effective 
because consumers feel more obligated to pay the original creditor than third-
party collectors.  Small businesses, however, usually don’t have the resources 
or manpower to collect these debts on their own.67  At this juncture, businesses 
have a couple of choices.  They can write off the debt entirely, deciding that 
their efforts to collect will not be cost effective.  However, many companies 
choose to send these account receivables to collection agencies, whose actions 
are covered by the FDCPA.68  A business may choose to either sell its debt off 
entirely to a debt buyer, sometimes for pennies on the dollar, or give a  
percentage payment to the collector.69  This guaranteed source of income from 
aging and uncollectable account receivables gives creditors a fixed cash flow.70  
Additionally, some creditors feel more at ease conducting their business, 
knowing that if a substantial amount of debt goes unpaid, they will be able to 
rely on debt-buyers for quick cash.71 
The amount of debt that is collected by third-party debt collectors is 
astounding.  At the time of the passing of the FDCPA in 1978, $5 billion in 
debt was assigned for collection.72  Since that time, the size of the industry has 
increased dramatically.  The face value of all debt sold to debt buyers in 1993 
was $1.3 billion.73  By 1997, that number had grown to $15 billion and sales 
reached approximately $25 billion in 2000.74  In 1992, there were five major 
debt buying companies in the United States.75  By 1998, that number had 
grown to 225,76 and by 2005 there were over 300.77  In 2005, the 6,500 
collection agencies operating in the United States, including debt buyers and 
percentage collectors, returned almost $40 billion back to businesses.78 
 
 67. Felicia A. Williams, Small Business Uncollected Debts: How to Hire a Debt Collection 
Agency, SUITE101.COM, Nov. 20, 2007, http://smallhomebusiness.suite101.com/article.cfm/ 
small_business_uncollected_debts. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Christopher Palmeri, Debt Collection Puts On a Suit, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_46/b3959128.htm (reporting 
that businesses can sell their debt for as low as 2 cents on the dollar and yield as much as 6 cents). 
 70. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 4, at 7. 
 71. Id. at 8. 
 72. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2 (1977). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. HERBERT A. ROSENTHAL, DEBT BUYERS ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE DEBT BUYERS 
ASS’N (Oct. 9, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/safeguard/dba.htm. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Ludwig, supra note 9, at 141; Robert M. Hunt, Collecting Consumer Debts: The 
Challenges of Change, BUS. REV., Second Quarter 2007, at 11, available at 
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The health care industry is heavily reliant upon collections.  This industry 
has been hit hard by bad debt on top of already slim profit margins, sending 
health care providers scurrying for quick cash flow.79  While many hospitals 
prefer to collect these account receivables themselves, this is becoming more 
complicated.80  Many of these accounts first make their way through hospitals’ 
in-house collection specialists, often with little success.81  In addition, many 
hospitals report that they lack the resources to effectively manage the 
complexity and sheer number of accounts.82  They find that selling aged 
receivables provides immediate cash flow, which is particularly important as 
economic times squeeze hospital budgets and resources.83 
B. Exacerbation of the Problem by Recession 
As America struggles through a recession, updating the FDCPA has 
become even more necessary in order to protect consumers, allow debt 
collectors to conduct their business, and keep businesses who depend on debt 
collectors viable.  As experts predict that America’s unemployment rate will 
climb to 9.5% by the end of 2010, its highest rate since 1983,84 Americans will 
have less money to pay their debts with.85  Thus, in times of economic 
struggles, the amount of bad debt companies must assign to collections 
increases.86  The two leaders of this rising debt are credit card debt and medical 
debt.87 
In addition, the recession has limited the number of financiers who are 




 79. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 4, at 2.  For example, the cost of a hospital 
stay has been outpacing inflation for years; the cost of staying in the hospital increased 13% 
annually from 1971–81.  Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment 
System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 501 (1990). 
 80. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 4, at 7. 
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. Id. at 7. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Courtney Schlisserman, Unemployment Benefit Rolls in U.S. Soar to Record, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& 
sid=aqc_bpAZTgqE. 
 85. Kate Murphy, Pity the Debt Collector, PORTFOLIO.COM, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.port 
folio.com/news-markets/top-5/2009/01/27/Trouble-for-Debt-Collectors. 
 86. In Hard Times, Writing Off Bad Debt Is More than Likely, THE SOUTHLAND TIMES, 
November 13, 2008, http://www.stuff.co.nz/southlandtimes/4760152a26783.html. 
 87. John D. Colombo, Federal and State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and 
Healthcare for the Poor, 51 ST. LOUIS U L.J. 433, 449–50 (2007); Hunt, supra note 78, at 7 
(noting that as of 2005, 79% of debts collected by collection agencies was for credit-card loans). 
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business particularly, as many lenders avoid these sometimes risky 
investments.88 
IV.  WHEN GIVEN A FAIR OPPORTUNITY, DEBTORS WANT TO PAY DEBTS THEY 
LEGALLY OWE 
In the world of debt collection, debate rages over who exactly is at fault for 
the large amount of delinquent account receivables sold by businesses every 
day.89  Many in the collections industry believe that most delinquent debtors 
are dishonest people who attempt to evade their responsibility to pay back 
money that they owe.90  The belief follows that even if they have the money to 
pay their debt, they would merely not pay by choice.  Under this premise, debt 
collecting agencies often train their employees that the only way to collect debt 
from these “deadbeat” debtors is through the use of threats, harsh language, 
and mentions of impending legal action.91  However, evidence suggests that 
when debt collectors engage in conduct that is abusive, it actually makes it less 
likely that the debtor will pay.92  Some collection agencies, who determine that 
the debtor simply will never pay, make little or no attempt to contact the 
debtor, and instead opt for an effective yet expensive legal judgment against 
the debtor.93  These judgments allow collectors to garnish the wages of 
debtors,94 taking the debtor out of the process almost entirely.  Other collectors 
use underhanded and manipulative means, such as convincing debtors that 
their unpaid debts can result in jail time or by asking for partial payment of the 
debt by check.95  When the partial payment is sent, collection agencies can use 
the check’s routing number to garnish bank accounts and wages of debtors 
without notification to the consumer.96  Lastly, out of mistrust of the debtor, 
 
 88. Witkowski, supra note 66. 
 89. Andrew Leonard, Dollars from Deadbeats, SALON.COM, Sept. 10, 2007, 
http://www.salon.com/technology/how_the_world_works/2007/09/10/deadbeats.  See generally 
Randall Kleinman, Deadbeats: Can You Force Them to Pay?, CBS MONEYWATCH.COM, Aug. 
1998, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3615/is_199808/ai_n8809730; DAVID CAPLOVITZ, 
CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974) (author asserts that credit 
and collection industry created this image as a way to justify unconscionable means to collect 
debt). 
 90. Griffith, supra note 36, at 762–63. 
 91. See id. at 763. 
 92. Bragg, supra note 25, at 477. 
 93. Ludwig, supra note 9, at 141. 
 94. Cliff Mason, Get Wise to Collection Agents’ Dirty Tricks, THESTREET.COM, Sept. 13, 
2007, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10379280/1/get-wise-to-collection-agents-dirty-tricks.html. 
 95. Id.; Woman Fights Back Against Bad Debt Collectors, CBS NEWS PITTSBURGH, Jan. 22, 
2009, http://kdka.com/consumer/credit.card.debt.2.915330.html [hereinafter Woman Fights 
Back]. 
 96. Woman Fights Back, supra note 95. 
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collection agencies often reject a payment plan previously offered by the 
original creditor or will not offer settlements to the debtor.97 
Unfortunately, Congress has recently passed legislation with this false 
premise in mind.  Specifically, updates to bankruptcy code in 2005 were 
instituted largely due to hard lobbying from the consumer-credit industry, 
which framed the issue that something had to be done about the deadbeats of 
society who incur high credit card bills they never intend to pay.98  This lobby 
insisted debtors would, instead of paying, wipe their record clean by filing for 
bankruptcy; as a result, it is now much more difficult to file for bankruptcy.99 
Despite this persistent belief in the ubiquity of the “deadbeat debtor” in the 
collections industry, there is zero empirical evidence to support this premise.100  
In fact, at the outset of the creation of the FDCPA, Congress concluded that the 
vast majority of those who were in default did not incur charges without the 
intention of paying.101  Congress thus believed that the passing of the FDCPA 
would not limit fair collection, as most debtors do strive to pay debts they 
legally owe when they are given the chance.102 
Congress’ finding was based on an extensive study of debtor psychology 
by sociologist Dr. David Caplovtiz.103  This study examined the spending 
habits of several debtors from a cross-section of the community in order to 
determine whether the concept of the “deadbeat” was widespread or 
mythical.104  After exhaustive research, Caplovitz determined that only 1.3% of 
Americans in debt had gotten there by making purchases they believed they 
would never pay for.105  Instead, the vast majority of those in default suffered 
from some sort of unexpected misfortune out of their control.106  The most 
common misfortunes suffered were adverse employment change, illness 
resulting in astronomical medical bills, or family problems.107 
 
 97. Pirone & Ferran, supra note 61. 
 98. Leonard, supra note 89 (stating that the bankruptcy reform of 2005 will result in a trend 
of higher debt collection numbers, as the law now makes it more difficult for consumers to 
eliminate their debt through declaring bankruptcy). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 3 (1977). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See generally CAPLOVITZ, supra note 89. 
 104. See generally id. 
 105. Id. at 5.58. 
 106. See generally id. 
 107. Id. at 5.1, 5.62, 5.70 (finding that the most common family problem resulting in 
substantial debt was divorce, usually exacerbated by excessive attorneys’ fees). 
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V.  ATTORNEYS’ USE OF TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 
When the FDCPA was passed in 1978, the collections industry was small 
and relatively unsophisticated.108  Although many collectors practiced their 
trade honestly, the industry was plagued by stories of egregious collection 
methods.  The modes of communication available to collection agencies were 
limited, making compliance with the FDCPA’s rules straight-forward.109  
While the intentions of the creators of the FDCPA were to protect consumers 
and creditors alike, several outdated and unclear provisions of the law have 
made collections a very tricky and complicated process.110  These provisions 
have allowed consumer-advocacy attorneys the opportunity to advertise to 
potential clients a dangerous proposition: “It doesn’t matter whether you owe 
the debt; it only matters if they can prove it,” and, “Not only will your debt be 
eliminated, but if collection companies make any minor mistakes, they will end 
up paying you!” 
Essentially, in order to have their clients’ legally owed debts eliminated, 
consumer attorneys bring a technical violation against the collector, forcing the 
collector to settle.111  They are able to do this because attorneys usually take 
FDCPA claims on a contingent basis,112 as it becomes easy to convince a 
potential client to pay no fee upfront in exchange for potentially lucrative 
 
 108. Shera Erskine, Please Leave a Message After the Tone: How Florida Lawyers Should 
Approach the “Mini-Miranda” Warning Requirement of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
32 NOVA L. REV. 245, 246 (2007) (citing Cindy D. Salvo, Technology and the Law (Debt 
Collection), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 2005, at 5. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Many consumer-advocacy attorneys are not subtle in their strategy of suing debt 
collectors for technical violations.  For example, attorney Stephen M. Otto’s law-firm website 
brazenly states, “[I]f a violation of the FDCPA is proven, the debt collector is liable. . . . Debt 
collectors, and some courts, sometimes refer to these violations as ‘technical’ and dismiss them as 
if they are not important.  I take issue with this.  They are violations.  This is strict liability.”  
Amy Good-Ashman, They Aren’t “Technical Violations,” It’s Called STRICT LIABILITY,” 
Abusivedebtcollection.com (March 24, 2008), http://www.abusivedebtcollection.com/2008/03/ 
24/they-aren%E2%80%99t-%E2%80%9Ctechnical-violations%E2%80%9D-it%E2%80%99s-
called-strict-liability.  Another example is the Law Office of Mark Anthony Silverthorn, who in 
his attempt to retain consumer clients, boldly proclaims, “Many violations of the FDCPA are 
technical in nature.  Some courts have ordered debt collectors to pay consumers thousands of 
dollars for mere technical violations, such as the failure to include required language on a 
collection letter.  Debt collectors often find it more cost-effective to settle these claims for a few 
thousand dollars, rather than go to trial and spend several times this amount in legal fees.”  Mark 
Anthony Silverthorn Law Offices, Why a Debt Collector May Have to Pay You Money?, 
http://www.collection-calls.com/help-collection-agency.html (last visited August 9, 2010). 
 112. Lynn A. S. Araki, Comment, Rx for Abusive Debt Collection Practices: Amend the 
FDCPA, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 69, 105–06 (1995) (finding that contingent-basis legal fees usually 
include little or no money up-front in exchange for an average of 33–40% of any recovery given 
to the attorney). 
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results.113  In addition, the plaintiff will only be required to pay the defendant’s 
attorneys fees if the court determines the claim was brought in bad faith.114  As 
a consequence, a “cottage industry” of consumer-advocacy attorneys115 has 
been very successful at exploiting the ambiguities in the law in order to coerce 
collection agencies to drop their legitimate claims.116  These attorneys often 
threaten to sue if they are not paid a quick settlement, knowing the cost of 
defending an FDCPA claim can easily reach $10,000 or more.117  Moreover, if 
the debtor prevails, the FDCPA requires the payment of attorneys’ fees.118  
One attorney in El Paso, New Mexico claims that suing for admittedly minor 
violations has been big business, as his average settling price is about $7,500 
plus a cessation of collection efforts.119  Essentially, for a collection agency, it 
is more cost effective to pay a settlement and forgive a debt than take a chance 
and fight a case in court, as several collectors have lost in the past due to minor 
violations.  As a result of these ambiguities, collection agencies are forced to 
charge businesses more in order to offset the risk of an FDCPA lawsuit.120  
Clearly, in order for the collections industry to survive, the law must be 
updated in order to allow honest collectors to perform their job effectively. 
A. The FDCPA Has Not Kept Current with Changing Communications 
Technology 
Several members of commercial advocacy groups bemoan the failure of 
Congress to update the FDCPA to keep current with technological changes in 
 
 113. Id. at 106. 
 114. One dissenting judge in this case angrily conjectured how the settlement negotiations 
likely proceeded between the plaintiff suing the collector under the FDCPA. Defendant: “Even 
though I do not believe you will prevail, I recognize your action was filed in good faith and, 
therefore, even if my client prevails on your claim, he will not be entitled to attorney fees.  
Therefore, in order to reduce his obligation to me for my attorney fees, my client hereby offers 
you the amount he believes you will receive even if you win.”  Plaintiff: “Ah, but if I prove even 
a technical violation, I will be entitled to attorney fees. . . . I believe it is possible that I can get 
more by going to trial so I reject your offer.”  Clayton v. Bryan, 753 So.2d 632, 635–36 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (Harris, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). But see Riddle & Assoc., P.C. v. 
Kelly, 414 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2005) (sanctioning a consumer-advocacy attorney for bringing a 
frivolous FDCPA claim). 
 115. Kenneth E. Rubinstein & Alexander G. Rheaume, Courts, Congress Send Mixed 
Messages to Debt Collectors, NEW HAMPSHIRE BUS. REV., July 27, 2007, http://www.all 
business.com/legal/banking-law-credit-regulation/5845493-1.html. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Araki, supra note 112, at 17, 28. 
 120. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115. 
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communications.121  While these groups had hoped that courts would fill such 
gaps with case law, several court decisions have placed collection agencies in a 
precarious position,122 leaving many legitimate companies wondering how to 
comply with federal law.123 
This issue stems from the “Mini-Miranda”124 which requires: 
§ 807: False or Misleading Representations 
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation 
or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the 
general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of 
this section: 
. . . 
(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the 
consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is 
oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to 
collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, 
and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the 
communication is from a debt collector.125 
It was originally believed that “initial communication” did not include any 
contact in which the debt collector did not speak directly to the debtor and 
instead merely asked the debtor to call the collector back.126  These 
communications include emails, voicemails and text messages.  However, in 
Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Association., the court ruled that “while [voicemail] 
messages may not technically mention specific information about a debt or the 
nature of the call, Section 1692e(11) applies to the information conveyed 
“directly or indirectly.”127  This, of course, includes instances in which the debt 
collector has left some form of message for the debtor to call him or her 
 
 121. Id. COMMERCIAL LAW LEAGUE OF AM., WHITE PAPER OF THE COMMERCIAL LAW 
LEAGUE OF AMERICA 1 (May 2007), http://www.clla.org/clla_resources/position_papers.cfm? 
paper=48 [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. Posting of Connie Prater to CreditCards.com Blog, Debt 
collector calling . . . and e-mailing . . . and texting?, http://blogs.creditcards.com/2008/02/debt-
collector-calling-e-mailing-texting.php (Feb. 27, 2008). 
 122. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115. Erskine, supra note 108, at 247. 
 123. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115. 
 124. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2006). WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 121, at 2. 
 125. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). (emphasis added). 
 126. According to the FTC Staff Commentary on the FDCPA, “[t]he term [communication] 
does not include situations in which the debt collector does not convey information regarding the 
debt, such as: [a] request to a third party for a consumer to return a telephone call to the debt 
collector, if the debt collector does not refer to the debt or the caller’s status as (or affiliation 
with) a debt collector.”  WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 3. 
 127. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115–16 (C.D. Cal. 2005); 
see also Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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back.128  Other corroborating authority has suggested that even if the 
information does not specifically mention the debt owed it still prompts the 
debtor to call back the collections agency which means the definition of an 
“indirect communication” has been met.129  Thus, a Mini-Miranda warning 
mentioning the debt, is required when leaving a message for a debtor. 
It is hard to argue that the requirement of the Mini-Miranda warning is 
unfair to collectors.  Without such a provision, collectors could find a loophole 
to avoid the disclosure requirement as well as other provisions of the FDCPA 
that relate only to “communications.”130 
However, the classification of a message left for the debtor as a 
“communication” under the FDCPA places collection agencies in an uncertain 
position.  The FDCPA, out of concern for consumer privacy, requires 
collectors to refrain from communicating with third parties about a debtor’s 
debt.131  For example, the FDCPA has banned the use of postcards to 
communicate the presence of debt out of fear that a consumer’s privacy will be 
breached.132  While nondisclosure laws do protect consumer privacy, the law 
has not yet taken into account the possibility of instances where the collector 
does not initially speak to the debtor, but simply leaves a message.  Courts 
have held that a Mini-Miranda warning left in a message does enough to alert 
third-parties about an outstanding debt to warrant civil remedies.133  With new 
methods of communication, consumer-advocacy attorneys have several 
possibilities to make a case for a violation.  If a debt collector leaves a 
voicemail message without a Mini-Miranda warning, they risk litigation under 
15 U.S.C. §1692a(11).  If the collector leaves a message that contains a Mini-
Miranda warning, they risk claims of illegal disclosure if a third-party 
overhears the message or if the message is left on the wrong answering 
machine or voicemail pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692c.134  Many collection 
agencies, out of fear of paying high civil damages, have stopped leaving 
messages altogether.135 
 
 128. Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
 129. Id. at 5–6. 
 130. Erskine, supra note 108, at 254. 
 131. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act , 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2006); Rubinstein & 
Rheaume, supra note 115. 
 132. 15 U.S.C. §1692f(7). 
 133. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115. For example, a message that sufficed to alert a 
third party of an outstanding debt was “Hello, this is Thomas Hunt.  Please have an adult contact 
me regarding some rather important information.  This is not a sales call, however, regulations 
prevent me from leaving more details.  You will want to contact me at . . . as soon as possible. . . . 
Thank you.”  WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 4. 
 134. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 6, 12. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 135. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115. 
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However, a complete cessation of leaving messages could have drastic 
consequences for the collections industry.136  This will harm the collection rate 
of agencies, whose losses will be passed on to consumers who pay their bills 
on time.137  Also, consumers could feel harassed138 or uneasy about an 
unknown number that appears on their Caller ID but does not leave a message. 
This, logically, could lead to more consumers suing and leave collectors few 
options if they cannot communicate with consumers.139  Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, this could preclude the possibility of working out a 
settlement,140 because if a collector can never get in touch with a consumer, 
they may have to resort to obtaining a judgment in court.  Several new and 
popular forms of media not only increase the likelihood of these types of suits, 
but open up the possibility of other potential violations that should be settled 
by Congress instead of needless litigation.  In addition, by virtue of the 
FDCPA’s status strict liability standard,141 the debt collector runs the risk of 
falling into several traps without updated legislation. 
B. Cellular Telephones 
One risk debt collectors face is contacting debtors on cell phones.  There is 
virtually no way of knowing whether the number provided by the debtor is a 
cell phone number.142  Even if a debt collector is aware he or she is contacting 
a cell phone, millions of Americans have eliminated their landlines in favor of 
cell phones.  In fact, one in four cell phone users does not have a landline at 
all.143  And with the economy in recession, many predict that this growing 
trend will continue, as landlines are viewed by many as unnecessary 
expenditures.144 
Without an update to the FDCPA, debt collectors face the possibility of 
fighting frivolous litigation, as the FDCPA’s strict liability standard gives the 
honest collector little defense.  Because cell phones usually accompany a 
 
 136. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 12. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 13. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115. 
 141. See Clark v. Capital Credit, 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006) (“‘Congress took 
care to require an element of knowledge or intent in certain portions of the FDCPA where it 
deemed such a requirement necessary’ further supports our conclusion that § 1692k(c) generally 
makes the FDCPA a strict liability statute.”).  See also Turner v. J.D.V.B., 330 F.3d 991, 995 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
 142. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 15. 
 143. David Ho, Mobile Phone Is Primary Phone for Many, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Oct. 3, 2008, at 5G. 
 144. Daniel Gross, Phones Without Homes: What’s Really Killing the Land-line Phone 
Business, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/149256; see Ho, supra note 
143. 
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person during the day, there is a risk that a collector could inadvertently 
contact a consumer at an “unusual time or place”145 or “at a place of 
employment.”146  In addition, the law is unclear whether a collector could face 
liability if he or she contacts a debtor in another time zone in which it is after 8 
p.m. or before 7 a.m.147  While these technicalities might seem trivial, they are 
likely sufficient for a consumer-advocacy attorney to drag an honest collector 
through needless litigation or extract a settlement with a substantial amount of 
attorneys’ fees. 
C Electronic Mail 
Several issues concerning email confront collection agencies.  Some 
collectors feel that communicating with debtors by email might be the best for 
both parties because it allows them a quick and easy way to communicate 
while empowering debtors with the choice of where and when to read the 
email or call the collector.148  In fact, one study revealed that by a margin of 
four to one, debtors prefer to resolve their overdue accounts over email as 
opposed to answering a call from a collector.149  The study further suggested 
that initial communication through email makes debtors more likely to agree to 
a settlement.150 
As the law exists today, when a debtor is sent a letter via the U.S. Postal 
Service, it is assumed that the letter will be read only by the debtor; any third-
party knowledge of the debt is not the fault of the collector.151  However, it 
remains to be seen whether this same standard applies to email.  What if an 
email is sent incorrectly, perhaps by errantly choosing “Reply to All?”  In one 
case, a collector in England  listed the names of 600 other debtors in a 
collections email.152  As a spokeswoman from a consumer group said, “The 
 
 145. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (2006). 
 146. If the debt collector knows that the debtor’s employer does not allow such calls, the 
collector may also incur liability.  Id. § 1692c(a)(3).  Posting by Chandra to Texas Lawyer Blog, 
http://www.uslaw.com/library/Texas/Fair_Debt_Collection_Practices_Act_Complaints_Rise.php
?item=100025 (April 1, 2008) (calls to work is the fourth-most-common complaint to the FTC 
regarding FDCPA violations). 
 147. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 15; Prater, supra note 121. 
 148. Lisa Rogak, Debt Collection Goes Virtual, CREDITCARD.COM, Oct. 16, 2008, 
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/virtual-debt-collection-agents-1273.php. 
 149. Id.  The report cited the fact that some consumers prefer the anonymity and privacy of 
handling collections over the Internet as opposed to over the telephone.  Id.  In addition, using 
email to collect a debt can be less confrontational.  Using email can be a win-win situation 
because the debtor becomes empowered as to when and where he handles the issue, as opposed to 
a phone call.  Prater, supra note 121. 
 150. Rogak, supra note 148. 
 151. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c); see WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 20. 
 152. Bailiff Admits to Privacy Blunder, BBC NEWS, Dec. 10, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/business/7775353.stm. 
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stories of careless handling of personal data are now a regular occurrence.  
This irresponsible disclosure of personal information  is just another 
example.153 
Another fear is the possibility that an employer, who possibly has the legal 
right to view employee’s email,154 might view a debt collection email.  With 
many Americans mixing their work and personal email,155 consumers might be 
concerned that employers could discover their outstanding debt, which could 
lead to possible termination or other issues at work.  In addition, when a debtor 
receives an email, even if it is after work hours, there is always risk that the 
email could be received while the debtor is working late, creating a possible 
violation of the FDCPA by contacting the debtor during an “unusual time or 
place.”156 
D. SMS Text Messaging 
In the last decade, Americans have grown increasingly accustomed to 
communicating via text message.157  In 2003, 14 billion domestic texts were 
sent within the United States.158  By the end of 2004, that number had reached 
25 billion.159  In just three years, that number has increased exponentially, as 
28.8 million texts were sent in the month of June 2007 alone.160 
With so many consumers accustomed to communicating through text 
messaging, collection agencies are finding text messaging to be a very 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. O’Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding warrantless searches of a government 
employee’s desk and file cabinets is permissible under the 4th Amendment if it is reasonable in 
scope and if it is justified at its inception by a non-investigatory, work-related need or a 
reasonable suspicion of work-related misconduct).  Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 
823 F.2d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that although employees have reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a private sector office, an employer reserves the right to search through 
“areas given over to his exclusive use” as long as the employee was previously notified.) 
 155. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 19. 
 156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (“[A] debt collector may not communicate with a consumer 
in connection with the collection of any debt . . . at any unusual time or place or a time or place 
known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.”). 
 157. See Eric J. Sinrod, Exploding Growth in Mobile Messaging, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 12, 
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/ericjsinrod/2005-01-12-sinrod_x.htm.  Text 
messaging is a way to communicate from one mobile phone to another using Short Messaging 
Service (SMS).  The typical text message allows 160 characters to be sent.  Marguerite Reardon, 
U.S. Text Usage Hits Record Despite Price Increases, CNET NEWS, Sept. 10, 2008, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-10038634-94.html (quoting Sen. Herb Kohl). 
 158. Sinrod, supra note 157. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Reardon, supra note 157. 
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effective method of informing consumers they owe money.161  Similar to email 
it gives the debtor more control and ownership over the process by allowing 
the debtor to call the collection agent back on his or her own time.162  One 
agency in Johannesburg, South Africa, reports that since it started using text 
messaging to communicate with debtors, its collections have improved 20% in 
three months.163  Another collection agency in London claims that texting 
produces a higher response rate than traditional methods of contact, increasing 
collection rates as much as 38% in some months.164 
Similar to email, text messaging presents legal risks similar to those posed 
by email communications.  Because most Americans carry their cell phones 
with them during the day, there is a risk that a collector could technically 
contact a debtor while they are at work, at any time of the day.  In addition, 
text messages occasionally deliver hours later than they are sent, creating a risk 
that debtors could receive collection texts out of the permissible hours under 
the FDCPA.165  Lastly, because text messaging to collect debt has yet to 
become popular in United States, the issue of whether a Mini-Miranda warning 
can fit into a text lingers. 
Essentially, as many other forms of communication are seen as 
advantageous for both the consumer and the debtor, the FDCPA must be 
clarified in order to make these alternative forms of communication 
mainstream.166 
E. Validation Notice 
Another source of litigation under the FDCPA is the requirement of a 
“Validation Notice.”  The FDCPA requires that the initial communication to a 
debtor must contain a notice to the consumer that he or she is allowed to 
dispute the listed debt.167  If the consumer chooses to dispute the debt, he or 
she must do so in writing, and upon receiving such notice, the collection agent 
must cease collection efforts until he or she is able to verify the debt.168  
However, much litigation has followed regarding the issue of whether the 
language accompanying the validation notice may express urgency and 
 
 161. Louise Bolotin, Now It’s Debt Collection—by Text, THE OBSERVER (London), June 3, 
2007, at 16, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/jun/03/creditanddebt.observer 
cashsection. 
 162. Rogak, supra note 148. 
 163. Iain Scott, SMS Messaging ‘Improves Debt Collection’, ITWEB (South Africa), July 22, 
2003, http://ww2.itweb.co.za/sections/business/2003/0307221107.asp?S=Business%20Applicatio 
ns&A=BAP&O=FRGN. 
 164. See Bolotin, supra note 161, at 16. 
 165. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (2006). 
 166. Prater, supra note 121. 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 
 168. Id. § 1692g(b). 
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excitement about the time within which the debt may be paid.169  Many courts 
have noted that this has confused the consumer and eliminated the purpose of 
the validation notice altogether.170  A consumer who has legitimate doubts 
about whether he or she actually owe a listed debt might be too afraid to 
contest it if the same collection letter warns that if they don’t pay in ten days, 
their credit will be adversely affected.  As one scholar put it, “One can hardly 
quarrel with the congressional intent to make the consumer fully aware of the 
salient aspects of the transaction, but the agony suffered by collectors and 
debtors alike in dealing with the validation section raises questions about the 
utility of the notice in its present form.”171 
While many collection agencies use forceful and harsh language in their 
initial communication, believing that such language is the only way a 
consumer will pay, it remains to be seen whether settlement tactics, at least 
initially, would be a more effective way to collect debt.  At least one court felt 
comfortable requiring that the debt collector use non-demanding or threatening 
language alongside its validation notice.172  In addition, while a plainly visible 
and clearly worded validation notice can inform consumers that they have the 
right to challenge their debt, it is still questionable whether the average 
consumer knows what to do next.  As result of this minimal requirement, much 
consumer ignorance still exists about how to properly contest a debt.  This 
issue particularly plagues older consumers, who are often confused about 
whether the debt actually exists, to what extent they are actually indebted, and 
what steps the collection agency is allowed to take.173 
VI.  AMEND THE FDCPA TO FULFILL ITS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
As stated above, when Congress passed the FDCPA, its goal was not only 
to end harassment by unfair debt collectors, but also to protect the collections 
industry from unscrupulous and harassing collectors.  Even though Congress 
understood the importance of the collections industry to the economy in 1978, 
it is unlikely that it imagined how important the industry would become.  
While the collections industry needs a fair chance to collect legally owed 
debts, they continue their efforts with the assumption that the majority of 
debtors with excessively delinquent accounts are “deadbeats” who never intend 
to pay.  As empirical evidence suggests, this is far from the truth: the vast 
majority of consumers feel a responsibility to pay debts that they legally owe, 
 
 169. See id. § 1692g(a). 
 170. Id. at 846. 
 171. Id. at 845. 
 172. See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 173. Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection 
After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 736 (2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
570 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:549 
especially to the original creditor.174  This well-supported theory directly 
negates the current consumer credit industry’s strategy, which justifies 
unnecessarily harsh and borderline illegal tactics to collect debts with the 
thought that these debtors are “deadbeats” who never intend to pay.175 
While the notion of the deadbeat debtor has largely been debunked, 
consumer-advocacy attorneys continue to spoil the relationship between 
consumers and creditors, causing consumers to give in to their worst 
temptations of not paying debt they know they legally owe.  By filing these 
frivolous lawsuits against collection agencies, sometimes for statutory fees and 
attorneys’ fees that far exceed the debt owed, collection agencies are being 
forced to eliminate legally owed debt entirely.176  However, many collection 
agencies are not innocent, as too many agencies take advantage of those who 
do not have the resources to protect themselves, threatening impossible 
remedies such as jail time.177 
At least one scholar has suggested that the FDCPA should be amended to 
eliminate the remedy of attorneys’ fees for the debtor, or at least make the 
standard much higher.178  However, this solution would highly discourage 
those who do have legitimate claims against unscrupulous debt collector.  
However, this could cause consumers with particularly little debt, even if not 
legally owed, in a position to just pay the collector as their best option.  What 
this suggestion does not take into account is that debtors who legally owe debts 
genuinely want to pay the money they legally owe.  However, the combination 
of unscrupulous debt collectors as well as greedy consumer-advocacy attorneys 
interferes with this process. 
Based upon these premises, there are several ways to protect collection 
agencies from frivolous lawsuits while allowing consumers the proper causes 
of action they need make legitimate claims against dishonest debt collectors. 
A. Validation Notice and Settlement Offer 
The FDCPA should be amended to require that the first communication 
sent to any debtor contain no demand for immediate payment.  This eliminates 
the possibility of litigation regarding the language accompanying the demand 
for payment, limiting the number of technical violations available to consumer-
advocacy attorneys.  It also allows consumers legitimate concerns regarding 
the validity of a listed debt to contest their liability without fearing that lack of 
immediate payment will lead to a bad credit rating or worse.  This 
communication should merely state that a debt is owed, list the amount owed, 
 
 174. See supra Part IV. 
 175. Goldberg, supra note 173, at 736. 
 176. See supra Part V. 
 177. See supra Part IV. 
 178. Araki, supra note 112, at 108. 
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explain the procedure for contesting a debt as well as listing the original 
creditor.179 
In addition, the 1-877-FTC-Help hotline number must be included in the 
letter, with a notice that if a debtor is confused about the debt or wants to file a 
complaint, he or she may call the number toll-free.180  This will allow 
uneducated consumers as well as minority and elderly debtors to inquire about 
the process of contesting a debt. 
In addition, debt collectors should be required to initially offer a 
reasonable settlement in an amount lower than the full amount of money owed 
if the debtor falls into a particular income category.  While the credit industry 
will likely argue that a deadbeat is a deadbeat and that attempts to negotiate or 
settle will do nothing, empirical evidence suggests otherwise.  Instead of a 
collector attempting to seek blood from a turnip, as studies reveal that a vast 
majority of delinquent debtors are in fact those who aren’t able to fully pay, 
collectors will likely have the advantage of wasting less money on collections 
while getting a portion of what they are owed if they initially offer a 
reasonable settlement.181  In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that if a bill 
is set at a level that a debtor could reasonably expect to be able to pay, debtors 
are more likely to pay it.182  In addition, all prior agreements that the original 
creditor had, including reduced payment plans, must be honored.  Giving the 
debtor the opportunity to be involved in the process, instead of merely being 
told exactly what they owe, will have the effect of making the consumer pay 
quicker, taking away from the traditional view of the collector as a distant, 
unscrupulous entity.  An informed consumer who has the ability to settle with 
a collection agency will be less likely to resort to the dishonest methods 
suggested by several consumer-advocacy attorneys. 
Although the collections industry might argue that a mandatory settlement 
offer requirement for qualified debtors would substantially hurt its profit 
margin, it need not look further than the Internal Revenue Service’s long 
 
 179. This is the Mini-Miranda warning. 
 180. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DEBT COLLECTION FAQS: A GUIDE FOR CONSUMERS (Feb. 
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre18.shtm.  This hotline, set up by the 
Federal Trade Commission, is for debtors to file complaints or ask questions.  While some may 
argue that this would increase litigation by informing a consumer of his or her right to take action, 
this author believes that the presence of this number on every validation notice would make debt 
collectors much more cautious and ethical in their collection efforts. 
 181. Murphy, supra note 85 (evincing the theory that, especially in economic downturn, 
collectors are having a particularly difficult time collecting debts because people simply do not 
have the money to pay, resulting in much lower profit margins for debt collectors.  Some 
collection agencies are even losing money.  As stated by one CEO of Kaulklin Ginsberg, a 
consulting firm for the collection industry, “[y]ou can’t get blood from a stone.”). 
 182. See James Unland, Letters to the Editor: Unfair Attack on Hospitals, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Mar. 2, 2006, at 32. 
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awaited Offer in Compromise Program.183  After years of the IRS struggling to 
collect back taxes from delinquent debtors, including using expansive 
collection tactics and obtaining expensive judgments, the IRS came to the 
conclusion that their efforts to collect from impoverished debtors were not cost 
effective.184  Instead, the IRS began the Offer in Compromise Program, which 
allows qualified debtors to negotiate with the Service based upon ability to 
pay.185  These settlements vary from lump sum payments to installment 
agreements.186  The stated goal of the program is to “achieve collection of what 
is potentially collectable at the earliest possible time and at the least cost to the 
Government.187  However, in order to qualify for an Offer in Compromise, the 
delinquent debtor is required to provide documentation, requiring the debtor to 
become active in the process.188 
One category of qualified debtors is “Doubt as to Collectability,” which is 
used when the IRS doubts that the debtor can actually pay the full debt before 
the statute of limitations has run.189  This category would likely be the most 
acceptable to the collections industry, as it appears to be the most cost effective 
as determined by the IRS.  In order to be eligible for this exception, a debtor 
would have to submit documentation proving the presence of a dire financial 
situation.  Another category is “Effective Tax Administration,” which says that 
although the debtor might be able to pay, making him pay would be “unfair” 
given his financial situation.190  This would likely place too much strain on the 
collections industry, and thus should not be sufficient to mandate required 
settlement offers. 
Similar proposals requiring debt collectors to offer reasonable payment and 
settlements to qualified debtors have been popular in the area of medical debt.  
For example, one proposal in the Illinois General Assembly suggested that in 
order for a hospital to receive or retain tax-exempt status, they must offer 
reasonable payment plans for less than cost to debtors who could not afford 
 
 183. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7122–7122f. 
 184. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS POLICY STATEMENT P-5-100 (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=111920,00.html [hereinafter IRS POLICY 
STATEMENT]. 
 185. 26 U.S.C. § 7122; Pamela Yip, A Kinder Uncle Sam: The IRS Backs Off Harsh Measures 
Against Taxpayers in Hardship, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 8, 2009, at 1D (stating that 
in this current financial crisis, the IRS has “taken steps to give [taxpayers] a break”; in addition, if 
taxpayers don’t qualify for the offer in compromise, the IRS now offers increased flexibility). 
 186. 26 U.S.C. § 7122c(1)(A)–(B). 
 187. IRS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 184. 
 188. Id. 
 189. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b)(2) (2010). IRS Tax Relief, IRS Offer in Compromise (2005), 
http://www.taxoic.com/oic.php. 
 190. Id. 
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pay their bills.191  Further, the proposed law set limits on the extent to which 
hospitals could sell their debts after they become delinquent.192 
B. Amend FDCPA to Take Into Account Recent Communications Technology 
In order to avoid inundating our nation’s court dockets with claims 
alleging technical violations of the FDCPA, Congress should amend the 
FDCPA to specifically account for changes in communications technology.  
The FDCPA should be amended to overrule the decision in Hosseinzadeh and 
expressly state that messages left for consumers, whether by email, text 
message, or voicemail, are not “communications” under the FDCPA and thus 
do not require a Mini-Miranda warning.  In order to be excluded from this 
definition, the message should only indicate the name of the caller, that the call 
concerns an adult matter and that the debtor should contact the person leaving 
the message as soon as possible.  This innocuous request should not be 
considered a communication, as it does very little to directly or indirectly 
communicate the presence of a debt.  As the FTC Commentary states, 
messages left for a debtor were never intended to be considered a 
“communication” within the definition of the statute.193 
If a collector leaves a message similar to the one stated above, the FDCPA 
should be amended to explicitly state that this message is not sufficient to raise 
privacy concerns contemplated by 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  This should apply to 
emails and other methods of communication as well.  This bright-line rule will 
save collectors from  a lose-lose situation by allowing collectors to reach 
debtors by leaving a message without risking suit for breach of privacy.  
Allowing collectors the opportunity to leave messages for debtors is 
instrumental in creating a meaningful dialogue between the two parties.  This 
will also solve the problem regarding communicating by text-messaging, as 
there will no longer be the requirement of a Mini-Miranda warning in text 
messages because they will not be considered “communications.” 
Concerning the issue of a collector reaching a debtor at an inappropriate 
time or place due to the use of cell phone, email or text message, the FDCPA 
should be amended to eliminate the strict liability nature of these violations.  
The use of email and text messaging is evolving into an effective and 
preferable way to collect debt for both the consumer and the collector.  Unlike 
the telephone, which requires the debtor to speak to the collector at the time of 
the call, emails and text messages allow the debtor the opportunity to the call 
the debtor back on his or her own time, allowing the debtor to not let collection 
efforts affect his or her work.194  A strict liability standard makes these means 
 
 191. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 88/30(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 192. Id. at § 88/30(b). 
 193. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 3. 
 194. See supra Part V.B–D. 
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of communication too risky for collectors, hurting the consumer and collector 
alike.  In addition, the rising use of cell phones at the expense of landlines also 
puts the collector at risk of litigation because, in many cases, this is the only 
way to contact the debtor at all.  As these mediums provide too many 
opportunities for claimants to allege technical violations of the FDCPA with a 
strict liability standard, the Act should be amended to require a claimant who 
alleges that collector has contacted him or her at an inconvenient time or place 
or at a place of employment195 to prove that a collector acted at least 
negligently.196  Thus, if a debtor informs a collection agency that they prefer 
not to be called at work, would rather not be text messaged, or do not want to 
handle their debt over email, any subsequent actions taken by the collector 
using these mediums could be considered violations.  These changes should do 
much to eliminate many of the hyper-technical violations congesting our 
courts, while letting truly aggrieved consumers collect damages against truly 
negligent collectors. 
In addition, the FDCPA should give the same presumption of privacy to 
email that it gives to collection efforts sent by U.S. Mail.  However, this 
creates an issue of whether an employer may be able to discriminate against or 
fire an employee he or she knows to have a large amount of outstanding debts.  
Thus, Congress should amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act197 to 
account for this problem.  This Act, which protects employees from being fired 
due to wage garnishments, should logically be extended to prevent employers 
from discriminating against employees who have accumulated large amounts 
of debt. 
C. Amend the FDCPA to Hold Original Creditors Liable for Negligent 
Hiring 
While I have laid out the reasons why Congress should amend the FDCPA 
to limit frivolous litigation, adequate safeguards are still necessary to protect 
consumers from unscrupulous collectors.  As stated before, the FDCPA does 
not consider in-house debt collectors to be “debt collectors” under the meaning 
of the statute.198  Congress listed several reasons for this decision, including: 
 
 195. See Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2006). 
 196. Although the standard would be raised from strict liability to negligence, the plaintiff 
would not be required to prove duty, breach, causation, and damages in the normal sense of 
common law negligence.  It would only require that the plaintiff prove that the defendant 
collector failed to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do under like 
circumstances.  For example, if a collector contacted a debtor at work after the debtor requested 
the collector not to, this would be negligent behavior. 
 197. Consumer Protection Credit Act, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Kizer v. Fin. Am. Credit Corp., 454 F. Supp. 937, 939 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (holding 
that “it clearly appears that the ‘debt collectors’ covered by DCPA are those who regularly collect 
debts for others and not creditors of consumers . . . .”  Thus, when the defendant did not attempt 
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“1) one-third of the states’ debt collection laws regulate creditors; (2) because 
debt collectors usually work on accounts that are at least six months overdue, 
these accounts are usually difficult to collect and are more likely to result in 
the use of harsh collection tactics; 3) independent debt collectors are the 
primary source of egregious collection practices; (4) in-house collectors 
generally restrain themselves from engaging in abusive debt collection 
practices because of their desire to protect and maintain the goodwill of their 
customers; (5) creditors are usually larger and more stable than third-party debt 
collectors; and (6) existing Federal Trade Commission remedies and 
enforcement are sufficient to regulate in-house collection practices.”199 
While is it safe to assume that in-house collectors are tempered in their 
efforts to collect debt in fear of alienating customers, the same cannot said for 
the next step in the collections process: assigning or selling the debt to a third-
party collection agent.  Assigning this debt allows the creditor the freedom to 
purportedly get higher returns on delinquent account receivables while turning 
a blind eye to dirty collection practices.200  This allows the creditor anonymity 
and avoids customers’ ill will.  The FDCPA has made a half-hearted response 
to this problem by making it illegal for original creditors to use pseudonyms 
when attempting to collect a debt in order to give the appearance to the 
consumer that a third-party collector has intervened.201 
While some leaders in the healthcare industry advise their members to 
perform a reasonable investigation to assure that the collectors they outsource 
to are ethical,202 it remains to be seen whether this protocol is widely practiced.  
Additionally, it can also be argued that when creditors do assign their debts, it 
is not difficult to ascertain whether the collector is ethical or not.203 
With this in mind, Congress should amend the FDCPA to create a federal 
cause of action allowing for direct liability against creditors who negligently 
 
to collect debts owed to another it was held not to be a “debt collector.); Perry v. Stewart Title 
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 199. Araki, supra note 112, at 81−82. 
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Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: An Overview RX for Debt Collection Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U. 
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 201. Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6) (2006).  See also Castro v. Revere 
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 203. See Colo. Capital v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
576 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:549 
hire collection firms that are abusive and harassing to consumers.  For good 
reason, many courts have thrown out the possibility of holding original 
creditors vicariously liable for the torts of their collectors largely due to the 
lack of an agency relationship.204  It would be unfair to hold a creditor strictly 
liable for the torts of a collection agency205 when they do not have any control 
over the methods the agency uses.206  Instead, holding a creditor liable as the 
employer of an independent contractor and thus requiring a creditor to use due 
diligence in choosing collectors is a more appropriate standard.207 
Claims for negligent hiring of collection agencies have experienced at least 
some success.208  In Colorado Capital v. Owens,209 the U.S. District Court of 
New York denied defendant Providian’s motion to dismiss a claim that, as an 
 
 204. See id. at 188; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000) 
(“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (the ‘principal’) manifests 
consent to another person (the ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and 
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent consents so to act.”). 
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No. 99CIV2039DDAFLN, 2000 WL 34494811 at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2000) (holding that a 
creditor can be held vicariously liable for the conduct of an attorney whom it hires to collect a 
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 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965) (“It is negligence to permit a third 
person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor 
knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself 
in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”). 
 207. See Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) 
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who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his 
physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking.”).  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
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involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”).  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 307 
cmt. b (1965) (“On the other hand, there are certain relations, of which that of master and servant 
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inspection the actual character of a thing turned over to him by even a careful person or bought of 
a reputable manufacturer.”). 
 208. See Freeman v. CAC Fin., Inc., No. 3:04 CV 981 WS, 2006 WL 925609, at *3 (S.D. 
Miss. Mar. 31, 2006) (holding that if the employer of an independent contractor “knows or should 
have known of an employee’s propensity for misbehavior, then the employer may be held liable 
for negligent hiring.”  Thus, if the plaintiffs can show that the original creditor knew how the 
collection agent was conducting itself, there may be a finding of liability.) (citing Jones v. Toy, 
476 So.2d 30, 31 (Miss. 1985)). 
 209. See Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 190; Castro v. Revere Collection Agency, No. 90-5684 
1991, WL 147529, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1991) (“The text of the [FDCPA], legislative history, 
and case law lead inescapably to the conclusion that, with a limited exception not present in this 
case, the [FDCPA] is applicable only to debt collectors, not the creditors who hire them.  Because 
Congress has made it clear that creditors are not generally covered by the Act, common law 
agency principles are inapplicable and may not be applied to impose liability on a creditor.”). 
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original creditor, it was negligent when it hired an abusive third-party 
collection agency. 
In this case, the plaintiff was subject to unfair and abusive collection 
practices in his attempt to contest a debt.210  The debt was originally owed to 
Providian, a bank that extends lines of credit through credit cards.211  The 
plaintiff alleged common law negligence, asserting that defendant had a duty 
of care under New York common law to exercise care in selecting, instructing 
and supervising debt collection firms it hired.212  The defendant argued that 
creditors do not owe a duty of care because there is no agency relationship 
between a creditor and a debt collector.  However, the plaintiff argued in the 
alternative that the defendant hired the collection agency as an independent 
contractor and was thus subject to direct liability.213 
On the issue of agency, the court agreed with defendant, holding that the 
defendant’s lack of control over the debt collector eliminated the possibility of 
an agency relationship.214  However, on the issue of whether the defendant and 
the debt collector shared a relationship of employer-independent contractor, 
respectively, at least for a motion to dismiss, the court agreed with the 
plaintiff.215  The court stated that although pertinent state common law holds 
that employers cannot be held directly liable for torts associated with their 
independent contractor, there is an exception for the negligence of the 
employer in selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor.216  This 
exception is a form of direct liability because it concerns the employer’s 
liability for its own actions or omissions rather than vicarious liability for the 
acts or omissions of its contractor.217  Thus, if the plaintiff can prove the 
elements of negligence, he or she can succeed on this claim.218 
 
 210. Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 187. 
 211. Id. at 187–88.  Providian Financial Corporation is a leading provider of credit cards to 
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After confirming the presence of an employer-independent contractor 
relationship, the court considered whether the defendant owed a duty of care to 
the plaintiff and whether Providian was truly the proximate cause of the 
damages suffered by the plaintiff.219  The court held that because creditors owe 
a duty of reasonable care to their customers,220 the defendant did indeed owe a 
duty to its customers.221  Specifically, the court felt comfortable with the 
notion that creditors should be able to reasonably foresee that a debt collection 
firm they hire could possibly resort to impermissible or objectionable conduct 
to collect its debt.222  As argued in the plaintiff’s memorandum to the court, a 
creditor like Providian has substantial experience as a consumer lender as well 
as employing debt collection firms to collect delinquent accounts.223  Because 
Providian was likely familiar with the business models of collection agencies, 
it either knew or should have known that there was a substantial risk that 
agencies were likely to be forced by financial pressures to violate the law.224  
Essentially, given most creditors’ experience and knowledge of the debt 
collection industry’s troubled history, hiring agencies which are known to use 
unethical means to collect money can be seen as prima facie negligent.225  
Thus, when a debtor makes such accusations against a creditor, the court must 
take certain factors into account when choosing a collector.  These factors 
include how long the creditor has been in the business of assigning debts, what 
the reputation of the collector is, and the business model employed by the 
collector.226 
As to the issue of whether a court could reasonably hold that a creditor 
proximately caused the damage, the court believed that an intervening act by a 
third-party does not necessarily break the causal connection between a 
defendant’s negligence and a plaintiff’s injury.227  Instead, the plaintiffs need 
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Colo. Capital v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 224. Id. at 5–6. 
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collector’s history before they assign debts. 
 227. Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 189−90 (citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 
N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980)). 
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only prove that the damages caused by the collection agency were reasonably 
foreseeable by the original creditor.228 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
While the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has succeeded in several 
ways, a closer look at the legislation suggests that several changes need to be 
made in order to realize the Act’s congressional intent.  With the United States 
in a recession, now more than ever Congress must amend the FDCPA to 
eliminate frivolous lawsuits alleging technical violations of the Act.  These 
lawsuits make it more difficult for lenders to extend lines of credit, make the 
job of debt collection harder than it has to be, and cause debtors to give in to 
their worst temptations of not paying debts they legally owe.  These lawsuits 
strain the relationship between the debtor and collector, making settlement of 
debt a near impossibility.  In order to preemptively stop these problems, 
Congress must create a federal cause of action allowing debtors to hold 
creditors liable for negligently hiring abusive collection agencies.  The FDCPA 
also must be updated to account for changes in technology and must require 
collectors to initially offer settlements to those debtors who are truthfully 
unable to pay their full debt.  Only then can the true intent of Congress, to 
protect consumers from unfair collection practices without imposing 
unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors,229 be fully realized. 
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